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STATEMENT OF CASE ON APPEAL
should be regarded merely as another contact and not the sole determinant
of jurisdiciton over an out-of-state cause of action.4" Perhaps a legislative
solution to this problem might resolve the present uncertain status of
New York attachment law.
43
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
Civil Procedure-Serving Statement of Case on Appeal in North
Carolina-An Unfortunate Interpretation
In North Carolina two formal steps are required in appealing a
decision from a trial court. The appellant must prepare and serve to the
appellee a statement of the case on appeal, and the case must be docketed
on the appellate court's calendar in accordance with the rules of the higher
court.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-2821 allows only fifteen days to serve statement
of case on appeal and ten days thereafter for counter case or exception,
but the statute includes a proviso that gives the trial judge discretion
"to enlarge the time in which to serve statement of case on appeal and
exceptions thereto or counter statement of case."2 The statute does not
expressly authorize any subsequent extensions of time to be ordered by
the judge hearing the case. As a practical matter, however, it is some-
times impossible for the appellant to secure a copy of the transcript of
the trial and to prepare his statement within the original extension period
set by the judge. Often the delay is occasioned by an official of the court,
but the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that this does not excuse
a failure to serve the statement within the time allotted.3 Consequently, it
has been common practice for the trial judge, even without specific statu-
REv. 550 (1967); Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiciton Based on Insurer's Obligations,
19 STANFo1 L. REv. 654 (1967).
" See, e.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and
the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUm. L. Rnv. 550, 567-71 (1967).
" Such a statute should at least do the following: (1) allow the insurer to set
up the defenses of the insured, (2) resolve whether the insurer can defeat an
action successfully on the insured's failure of cooperation, and (3) clearly specify
the minimum contacts in New York sufficient to attain jurisdiction.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-282 (1953).
2 Id.
'State v. Wescott, 220 N.C. 439, 17 S.E.2d 507 (1941) (illness of the court
reporter); Rogers v. City of Asheville, 182 N.C. 596, 109 S.E. 685 (1921) (stenog-
rapher busy).
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tory authority, to grant a second and even a third extension for service of
the case upon request by the appellant.
Most appeals are now taken to the new intermediate appellate court.4
Rule 5 of the North Carolina Court of Appeals provides that the case on
appeal must be docketed within ninety days after judgment.' Yet, the trial
judge is authorized to extend the time for up to an additional sixty days
for good cause shown. Construing § 1-282 and Rule 5 together, the
reasonable and practical construction would be that since the trial judge
can extend the time for both serving and docketing the case on appeal and
since there is no express limitation on his granting successive extensions
for service or docketing, he has the authority to grant successive extensions
of time for service and docketing. The only implicit limitation would be
that the extensions of time for service of case on appeal cannot exceed
the one hundred and fifty day limit for docketing imposed by Rule 5.'
Interpreting the statute narrowly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held in Roberts v. Stewart7 that additional extensions of time granted
by the trial judge for service of the case on appeal were entered without
authority because upon filing the notice of appeal the case was removed
to the court of appeals.' Since there was no case on appeal before the
court, the court reviewed only the record proper for error, and finding
none, affirmed the decision of the superior court.
As authority for its decision, the court in Roberts relied principally
upon American Floor Machine Co. v. Dixon.' There the supreme court,
in interpreting the statute creating a county civil court,"0 held that upon
filing notice of appeal from the county court to the superior court the case
was removed to the higher court, thereby making the trial judge functs
officio." The judge thus no longer had jurisdiction to extend the time
for service of case on appeal beyond his original order setting the time
'See Steed, The North Carolina Court of Appeals-An Outline of Appellate
Procedure, 46 N.C.L. REv. 705 (1968).N.C. CT. APP. R. 5 (the rules may be found in the 1967 supplement to Volume
4A of N.C. GEN. STAT.).
' In granting extensions of time for service, the trial judge must allow sufficient
time to settle the statement of the case if the appellee files exceptions, so that
docketing may still take place under Rule 5.
'3 N.C. App. 120, - S.E.2d - (1968).
8 Id. at 124, - S.E.2d at - (1968).
9260 N.C. 732, 133 S.E.2d 659 (1963); accord, Pelaez v. Carland, 268 N.C.
192, 150 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
"0 Ch. 691, § 59, [1937] N.C. SEss. LAWS (repealed 1967) (this statute pro-
viding for the establishment of county civil courts was repealed in 1967 when the
statutes setting up the new district court system became effective).
21260 N.C. at 735-36, 133 S.E.2d at 662.
[Vol. 47
STATEMENT OF CASE ON APPEAL
for service.12 His only remaining authority was to resolve the statements
of case on appeal, if the appellee filed a counter statement or exceptions
that gave a different account of the events at trial, or to adjudge an
abandonment of the appeal.13
It is arguable that the court reached a correct result in Roberts since
the supreme court's ruling in American Floor Machine Co. was rendered
in 1963 and the profession and bench should have been aware of the
opinion. Yet, the court was not interpreting § 1-282 in American Floor
Machine Co., even though the situations were analogous in that both in-
volved an appeal to a higher court. Moreover, to apply the familiar fiction
that an attorney and judge are deemed to "know the law" seems un-
necessary and even unfair in this circumstance where practicality should
be a paramount consideration and where a contrary result could have
rested upon a more reasonable interpretation of the purposes of the statute
and court rule.
The fact that the court of appeals heard three other cases in 1968 deal-
ing with extensions of time for service should testify to the frequency of the
practice. In the first case, Smith v. Stevens,' 4 the court chose not to dis-
miss the appeal ex inero motu, the appellee not having moved to dismiss.
The court considered the appeal on the merits and granted a new trial,
although the trial judge had granted subsequent extensions to serve the
statement of case on appeal under color of Rule 5, but had not extended
the time for docketing the case. Another case, Williams v. WVilliams,'5
was dismissed under Rule 1616 because the statement was served one
hundred and fifty-three days after judgment was entered. In State v.
Farrell,17 decided after Roberts, the appellant had been granted successive
extensions of time totalling one hundred and twenty days to serve the
case. The court said the appeal should be dismissed. The court reviewed
the record, however, "to determine that justice is done," and found no
prejudicial error,' s even though, unlike Roberts, no order was entered
extending the time for docketing, which took place one hundred and fifty
days after the judgment. In a parenthesis in the opinion, the court said:
12 Id.
1d.
"1 N.C. App. 192, 160 S.E.2d 547 (1968).
1 N.C. App. 446, 161 S.E.2d 757 (1968).
16 Rule 16 provides for a motion, before argument on the merits of the case, to
dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with the requirements of statutes or rules
of the court in perfecting an appeal.
"73 N.C. App. 196, - S.E.2d - (1968).
18 Id. at 200, - S.E.2d at -.
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Each of these extensions of time was consented to by the Solicitor and
upon this record we make no decision whether the trial judge has
authority under G.S. 1-282, with or without the consent of the parties,
to extend the time for serving case on appeal beyond that contained
in the original order extending the statutory time.19
This statement could indicate that the court itself did not "know the law"
it had so recently set forth. On the other hand, the court may have thought
that this issue was not ripe for consideration because no extension had
been granted for docketing.
The technicality in appellate procedure raised by the court's decision
in Roberts was rectified in early 1969 by newly adopted Rule 50.
If it appears that the case on appeal cannot be served within the time
provided by statute, rule, or order, the trial judge (or the chairman of
the Industrial Commission or the chairman of the Utilities Commission
as the case may be) may, for good cause and after notice to the opposing
party or counsel, enter an order or successive orders extending the time
for service of the case on appeal and counter-case or exceptions to the
case on appeal, provided this does not alter the provisions of Rule 5
relating to the docketing of the case on appeal.20
It is interesting to note that the North Carolina Supreme Court in effect
overruled the decision in Roberts by adoption of a court rule rather than
by judicial decision.
It is arguable that § 1-282 pre-empts the field of service of the case,
thereby making the supreme court's promulgation of Rule 50 technically
improper.2 1 Service of the case, however, seems to be a procedural require-
ment for appeal and the supreme court has exclusive authority under the
constitution 2 and by statute23 to provide rules of practice and procedure
for the appellate division. Thus, if Rule 50 is interpreted to be in conflict
with § 1-282, the statute would seem to be invalid because the legislature
cannot change a rule of the court.24 Yet, Rule 50 may be seen as nothing
29 Id. at 198-99, - S.E.2d at -.
" N.C. CT. APP. R. 50 (since this new rule was only adopted Feb. 11, 1969, as of
this writing it may only be found in advance sheet No. 3 to 3 N.C. App. at xv).
" See Lehnen v. Hines & Co., 88 Kan. 58, 127 P. 612 (1912) (dictum) (court
may enforce reasonable rules regulating practice in pending cases, but times set by
statute within which steps are to be taken cannot be shortened by rules).
"N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 11.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-33 (Supp. 1967).
" State v. Martin, 210 N.C. 459, 187 S.E. 586 (1936); Calvert v. Carstarphen,




more than a clarification of the meaning of § 1-282,25 in which case Rule
50 would not be an implicit declaration by the supreme court that § 1-282
is invalid as an infringement on the court's right to promulgate pro-
cedural rules for the appellate division.
As a word of warning to the practicing bar, it should be emphasized
that Rule 5 itself does not specifically authorize the trial court to enter
successive orders extending the time for docketing the case on appeal.
Possibly, then, a trial judge may have jurisdiction to issue only one
order extending the time for docketing the appeal. Thus, it may become
necessary for the supreme court to adopt a docketing rule, similar to
Rule 50, authorizing the trial judge to grant successive extensions of time
for docketing the appeal within the one hundred and fifty day limit of
Rule 5. Hopefully, in making future rulings on appellate procedure, the
new intermediate court will be less narrow in its view of the processes
of appeal and will accommodate its interpretation of the rules to the
practicalities involved.
ROBERT A. WICKER
Contracts-Contracts To Devise-Effect of Excluded Forced Heirs
A contract to make a will necessarily juxtaposes the law of contracts
and of decedent's estates and brings into conflict the policy of compelling
performance of a promise with that of allowing free testamentary disposi-
tion.' A recent case, In re Estate of Stewart,2 injected a third basic con-
sideration: the effect of an excluded forced heir upon the distribution of
property willed pursuant to an antenuptial contract to devise. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held the contract beneficiaries' interest paramount
to the forced heir's claim, thus upholding the policy for contractual cer-
tainty of performance against the challenge posed by the conflicting policy
disfavoring spousal disinheritance. The court's treatment of the problem
brings the factors involved sharply into focus.
In 1936, Walter Stewart, his wife Jennie, and his brother John, co-
tenants of specific real property, entered into a written contract to devise
See text accompanying notes 5 & 6, supra.
Note, Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third
Parties, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 423 (1967); see generally, 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 963 (1965).
- Cal. 2d -, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
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